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2012 UPDATE:
DEVELOPMENTS IN
NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW

Tom Daily

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ARKANSAS NATURAL RESOURCES LAW
Thomas A. Daily1
It has been uncommonly quiet on the natural resources litigation front recently. I
am not sure why that is. Perhaps diminished natural gas prices account for some of
that,2 or it could just be random luck. Regardless, the absence of a lot of trees gives me
time and space to discuss the forest in greater depth than normal.
This year’s developments include two important Strohacker cases, so we will
review the total entirety of the Strohacker Doctrine as it now stands. A second group of
cases may reveal a tendency of the Arkansas Court of Appeals to avoid applying rules
of property when it does not like the result of doing so. These two subjects have a thing
in common. Both present difficulties to the mineral title examiner.
TWO RECENT DECISIONS PROMPT STROHACKER REPRISE3
We will see, soon enough, where Strohacker has recently gone. First, though,
for the in-depth Strohacker discussion which I promised above, I shall begin at the
beginning.4
Arkansas’ Strohacker Doctrine originated with the Arkansas Supreme Court’s
decision in Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Strohacker.5 There, a majority of six justices
affirmed a chancellor’s conclusion that the railroad,6 the grantor in 1892 and 1893
deeds of lands in Miller County, in reserving “all coal and mineral deposits” did not
1
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intend to reserve oil and gas.7 From a careful reading of the court’s recitation of the
facts, it appears that the railroad’s true subjective intent had more to do with protecting
itself in the event of a mineral claim by its own grantor, the United States, than actually
reserving anything of value to itself.8 Subjective intent was not the determinant,
however. The Court stated:
If the reservations had been made at a time when oil and gas production, or
explorations, were general, and legal or commercial usage had assumed them
to be within the term “minerals”, certainly appellant should prevail. As early as
1911 gas was referred to in this state as a mineral. Osborn v. Arkansas
Territorial Oil & Gas Company, 103 Ark. 175, 146 S.W. 122. (Additional citations
omitted) (Emphasis added)9
Thus, the Supreme Court reached its conclusion based, at least in part, upon the
record of contemporaneous “legal or commercial usage” of the term “minerals” in 1892
and 1893. Interestingly, nowhere in its Strohacker opinion did the Court limit its
conclusion therein to Miller County, where the lands at issue were located. The
apparent location-based determination of the Strohacker Doctrine originated in a later
case which will be discussed below.
Later in its Strohacker opinion, the Court cited supporting authority from other
jurisdictions for the contemporaneous construction principle. Among those was the
ancient Pennsylvania case, Schuylkill Nav. Co. v. Moore.10 Quoting from Schuylkill, the
Court stated:
The best construction is that which is made by viewing the subject of the
contract, as the mass of mankind would view it; for it may be safely
assumed that such was the aspect in which the parties themselves viewed
it.” (Emphasis added.)11
7
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That quotation from Schuylkill created uncertainty in Strohacker itself as to the
precise objective standard required. “Legal or commercial usage” is the language of
commerce, spoken and written by lawyers, bankers and merchants, all, by definition,
knowledgeable, educated persons. Since the court is construing a legal document, a
deed, a standard based upon contemporaneous usage by such knowledgeable,
educated persons makes sense. After all, it is they who draft deeds.
Those same lawyers, bankers and merchants are, of course, part of the “mass of
mankind” but they make up only a small portion of that mass. Much of the mass of
mankind could not and should not be expected to understand the meaning of the
language of a mineral reservation in a deed. Still, many today misread Strohacker to
require a historic generic mineral grant or reservation to pass the “mass of mankind”
test. I respectfully submit that is wrong, and the distinction between the “mass of
mankind” test and “legal and commercial usage” is important.
Awareness of commercial developments and commercial opportunities comes to
those who speak legal or commercial usage somewhat sooner than to most everyone
else. Thus, all other things being equal, one would expect the body of thought of legal
and commercial usage to include oil and gas as minerals well before it became known
to the masses.
Another thing to be learned from Strohacker is that the time window of
uncertainty as to the meaning of the unspecific mineral reservation, vis-a-vis oil and
gas, was really quite small. Strohacker bracketed that window on the bottom by the
year 1893, the date of the latest of the deeds construed in Strohacker, and 1911, the
date of Osborn v. Arkansas Territorial Oil & Gas Company,12 where the court first stated
that oil and gas were included within the term “minerals.”
The next of the Strohacker decisions was Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v.
Furqueron,13 a case decided only about five years after Strohacker, with nearly identical
facts. The latest of the Furqueron deeds was executed in 1894, as opposed to 1893 in
12
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Strohacker, but the remainder was merely a replay.14 The county was even the same,
Miller County.15
The chancellor ruled that the Furqueron reservations did not include oil and
gas.16 The railroad had unsuccessfully urged the court to reverse and to overrule
Strohacker as being “unsound and not in accord with the weight of authority.”17 In a
brief opinion, the court declined to do that, instead quoting not from body of the
Strohacker opinion, but from one of its headnotes:
By excluding from deeds executed in 1982 and 1983 ‘all coal and mineral
deposits’ pertaining to lands in Miller County, the company no doubt had
in mind, as did its grantees, only substances then commonly recognized
as minerals and in view of evidence of such intent the language was not
sufficient to reserve oil and gas.18
So Furqueron accomplished two things in the development of the Strohacker
doctrine. First, it shortened, by one year, the beginning of the window of uncertainty,
from 1893 to 1894. Second, by its above quotation from the Strohacker headnote, the
court tended to emphasize the locale of the lands involved, Miller County. Somewhat
inconsistently, the quoted headnote also seems to emphasize the railroad’s subjective
intent as a basis for the result, which is contrary to manner in which the Strohacker
Doctrine has subsequently developed.
The next Strohacker case, Carson v. Mo. Pac R. Co.,19 has little to do with the
issue in the this discussion, because it involved bauxite, rather than oil and gas.
Moreover, an analysis of Carson itself causes the reader to question whether its result20
was reached because of Strohacker, or because removal of bauxite involved surface
destruction, repugnant to deed’s granting clause.
The next oil and gas case in the line of Strohacker decisions was Brizzolara v.
14
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Powell.21 The Brizzolara deed contained language identical to that in Strohacker and
Furqueron. However, the date and location were different. The Brizzolara reservation
was within an 1897 deed, three years after the later of the two deeds construed in
Furqueron. The lands were in Johnson County, rather than Miller County. 22
It is notable that Brizzolara is the only case in the Strohacker line, involving oil or
gas, which resulted in a reversal of the chancellor by the Arkansas Supreme Court.
However, that was not a reversal on the merits. Rather, the court determined that the
parties and the chancellor had proceeded on the wrong theory and, so, remanded the
case for additional proof. The chancellor had apparently decided that the 1897
reservation did not effectively reserve oil and gas, as a matter of law, relying upon
Strohacker and Furqueron. In its opinion, the court first stated that the “rule of
Strohacker” had:
become a rule of property on which have been founded innumerable
important transactions. To change the rule now would invalidate many
titles acquired upon faith in the original decision. Consequently,
regardless of our individual views as to the merits of the Strohacker rule, it
is the unanimous opinion of the court that it has become a rule of property
which should not be disturbed.23
Then the court continued, concluding that this “rule of property” was not a rule of law, at
least not entirely. Rather, it incorporated a question of fact.
The Strohacker opinion held that in the deed there construed, executed in
1892, the same language as is now before us did not as a matter of fact
express an intention to reserve oil and gas. The Furquerton case, on
similar proof, ruled that this same intention prevailed as to another Iron
Mountain conveyance in 1894. Here, however, the question involves the
intent with which these words were used in a different deed in 1897.24
I must respectfully question the Brizzolara court’s conclusion that “innumerable”
important transactions have been “founded” upon the Strohacker Doctrine. It just does
not work that way. The Strohacker Doctrine does not provide any such instruction upon
21

214 Ark. 870, 218 S.W.2d 728 (1949).
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which transactions may be founded.
Rather, Arkansas mineral title examiners have learned from Strohacker and the
cases which followed only that early unspecific conveyances or reservations of
“minerals” cannot be confidently interpreted, one way or the other, where oil or gas is
concerned. Occasionally, we might have taken a calculated risk that unspecific mineral
conveyances or reservations made before about 1895 did not effectively convey or
reserve oil and gas, and that those executed after about 1910 did. However, whenever
our clients made, or make today, such a decision, they assume the risk that they may
be proven wrong, after-the-fact, when litigation arising in some new county proves them
to have been bad guessers.25 Instead, in cases where the unspecific grant or
reservation lies within the early window of uncertainty, most title examiners have
cautioned producers to protect themselves by buying a policy of insurance, leasing both
sides of the potential dispute (economic waste) and awaiting the result of timeconsuming and expensive litigation (more economic waste).
Rules of property should bring certainty and predictability to real property law, so
that transactions may be confidently founded thereon. The Arkansas Supreme Court
has defined a rule of property as:
[a] settled legal principle governing the ownership and devolution of
property; the decisions of the highest court of a state when they relate to
and settle some principle of local law directly applicable to title. In the
plural, those rules governing the descent, transfer, or sale of property, and
the rules which affect the title and possession thereto.26
Rules of property “have come into existence and have been continued because of the
ever present need for stability and predictability” in the law of real estate.27 A rule of
property is rarely overturned because the bar has relied on such rule in drafting
instruments and advising clients.28 The fact-dependent Strohacker Doctrine is, in that
25
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respect, the opposite of a rule of property, or, at least, it leads to an opposite result.
Brizzolara provided no additional insight into the meaning of the Strohacker
Doctrine. The Brizzolara court nowhere suggested that there might be some critical
difference between the early state of legal or commercial usage between Johnson and
Miller Counties. Indeed, references to “legal or commercial usage” are altogether
absent from the Brizzolara opinion, as are any references to the “mass of mankind.”
Rather, the remand was to take proof of “intent.”
Unfortunately, Brizzolara ended right there. The case never returned to the court
and so we have no idea, to this day, whether or not a 1897 reservation of “all coal and
mineral deposits” effectively reserved oil and gas in Johnson County (a county with a
history of somewhat prolific gas production).
The next case in the Strohacker line was Stegall v. Bugh.29 Unlike the previous
cases, Stegall did not involve a reservation in a deed from a railroad. Rather, B. H.
Stegall and his wife, the appellant’s parents, conveyed lands in Union County in 1900
with a deed, the granting clause of which concluded “except the mineral interest in said
lands.”30 The appellant’s proof at trial tended to prove that his parents were aware of oil
potential beneath the deeded lands and thus subjectively intended to reserve oil and
gas by those words.31 However, the chancellor ruled otherwise at trial and the
Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, seemingly departing from its “intent” based ruling in
Brizzolara. Rather, the Stegall court returned to objective determination of
contemporaneous “legal and commercial” usage which it had suggested, less clearly, in
Strohacker and Furqueron.32 Unfortunately, the court also repeated the “mass of
mankind” quotation from the Pennsylvania Schuylkill decision, inferring, incorrectly, that
legal and commercial usage and the vernacular of the masses were one and the
same.33 Stegall is surprising on another level. There are references within the Stegall
opinion to evidence in the record tending to show that, by 1900, knowledge of oil and
29

228 Ark. 632, 310 S.W.2d. 251 (1958).
Id. at 632-33, 310 S.W.2d at 252.
31
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gas was general, and well within the legal or commercial meaning of the term
“minerals.”34 Why, then, did the Appellant, Stegall, lose the case?
Here, as a theory, is a simple explanation, which illustrates another of the
problems with the present Strohacker Doctrine. Stegall was an appeal from a
chancellor’s decision, as was every other Strohacker case. (The modern equivalent of
a chancellor is a circuit judge sitting in equity.) These cases were really not decided by
the Arkansas Supreme Court, at all, in the truest sense. Rather, the issue before the
appellate court was simply whether the trial judge’s factual conclusions were or were
not clearly erroneous.35
Ours is a system weighted, deliberately, in favor of affirmance. Facts determined
at trial are rarely reversed. Strohacker, rule of property or not, presents every case as a
question of fact.36 It is likely that if the chancellor had ruled in Stegall that oil and gas
were within the legal and commercial meaning of the term minerals in Union County in
1900, his decision, though opposite in result, would likewise have been affirmed as not
clearly against the preponderance of evidence. Such a system makes it near
impossible to distill a reliable rule from which to determine ownership of oil and gas in a
significant number of situations. An area of the law which most needs predictability is
unnecessarily unpredictable.
Justice McFaddin authored the first of his two dissenting opinions in Stegall.
That dissent begins with the heart of the matter:
I think the time has come when this court should declare that by January
1, 1900 it was generally considered and understood that oil was a
mineral.37
34

Id. at 637-38, 310 S.W.2d at 255.
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36
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Justice McFaddin then traced the line of Strohacker cases decided to that date (1958),
observing its several internal inconsistencies. However, much of his Stegall dissent
deals with uncontroverted facts which he said justified his conclusion above:
(b) The next point is that prior to 1900 the oil fraternity generally
understood that oil (i. e. petroleum) was a mineral. The record here before
us shows that as early as 1887 and 1888 there were reported traces of oil
in wells drilled in Sebastian County, Arkansas; (citations omitted) that oil
had been discovered in Louisiana before 1900; and that gas had been
discovered in East Texas as early as 1868. The record shows that in
1895 and 1896 oil had been developed in commercial quantities in the
fields in Corsicana, Texas. If people in Sebastian County, Arkansas, and
in North Louisiana, and in Corsicana, Texas, considered oil as a mineral in
the years mentioned, why should the oil fraternity of Union County,
Arkansas, be considered to be less intelligent?
(c) Then, there is the matter of general information. Publication of the
Ninth Edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica was completed in 1889; and
in Vol. 18 of that edition, beginning on page 72, there is an article of
several pages on the subject of petroleum, which is called 'rock oil'.
Likewise, in the same Ninth Edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica
(publication completed in 1889) there is in Vol. 16 at pages 346 to 431, an
exhaustive article on the subject of 'Mineralogy', which is the study of
minerals. It is there stated on page 346: 'Mineral bodies occur in the three
physical conditions of solid, liquid, and gas'. Then on page 430 of the
same volume--in the index of minerals--petroleum is listed as Mineral No.
707; and on page 428, in discussing 'petroleum', it is again listed as a
mineral. Let it be remembered that it was in 1889 that the Ninth Edition of
the Encyclopedia Britannica completed its publication; and copies of this
edition have been in Arkansas since before 1900. So, I make the point
that by January 1, 1900 petroleum was considered as a mineral by
general information; and we should now so declare.38
The final of the early Arkansas Supreme Court decisions in the Strohacker line of
cases was decided 46 years ago in 1966. It was Ahne v. Reinhart & Donovan Co.39
Ahne, uniquely, involved a conveyance, rather than a reservation. In 1905,
George Heim conveyed to Arkansas Anthracite Coal Company “all of the coal, oil and
mineral” within certain lands in Logan County.40 Thus the deed’s language was a little
different from that of previous reservations, since oil was explicitly mentioned.
38
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However, the dispute involved the ownership of gas, not oil.41 The Arkansas Supreme
Court characterized the issue to be decided in these terms:
The issues joined presented a fact question as to whether gas was a
commonly recognized mineral in Logan County in 1905 when the Heim
deed was executed, and the fact question was submitted to the chancellor
upon a comprehensive array of historical exhibits and was determined
adversely to appellants. The case is here on appeal, the dispositive
question being whether the chancellor erred in his finding, as a fact,
that gas was a commonly recognized mineral in Logan County when the
Heim deed was executed on July 26, 1905.42
The court then catalogued what it referred to as the most pertinent exhibits, made a
brief analysis of its prior decisions, and concluded:
Based upon our recitals as to the facts in this case and as to the
applicable principles of law, we have concluded that the finding of the
chancellor that gas was a commonly recognized mineral in Logan
County on July 26, 1905, is not against the preponderance of the
evidence in this case and that the judgment entered thereon should not
be disturbed.43
Thus, as noted above, the findings of fact critical to the result were made, not by
the Arkansas Supreme Court, but by the chancellor. That chancellor’s ruling was not
clearly against the preponderance of evidence, so it was affirmed. I suspect that had
the chancellor ruled, on the same record, that gas was not a commonly recognized
mineral in Logan County in 1905, that ruling would likely still not been against the
preponderance of the evidence, either, and likewise would have deserved affirmance,
though it would have been opposite in result.
In one rather frightening sense, these decisions have virtually no precedential
value. They are simply affirmances of specific findings of fact, not decisions of law.
Tomorrow, we could litigate the effect of a slightly earlier (e.g.1904) conveyance or
reservation in the same county relatively unimpacted by Ahne, because that decision
establishes nothing more than that a chancellor, based upon the record before him that
day, did not make a call bad enough to deserve reversal.
41

Id. at 692, 401 S.W.2d at 566.
Id. at 692, 401 S.W.2d at 566-67 (Emphasis added).
43
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Ahne made another contribution to our historical misunderstanding of the
Strohacker Doctrine. The most direct statement that the doctrine has an element of
location comes from the following paragraph from Ahne:
Different factual situations have existed and may continue to exist as to
what substances constitute commonly known and recognized minerals in
various areas of the state. It was apparently for this precise reason that
the court recognized the need for such a rule of construction as that
announced in the Strohacker case.44
Unfortunately, it is that this very location-based factual analysis which opens the near
endless combination of dates and places when and where this vital issue cannot be
resolved without further litigation and the economic waste there associated.
Arkansas has 75 counties. Many of those contain known commercial oil and/or
gas reserves. Some other, where such reserves are presently unknown, may be the
site of the next big discovery. Were we to start with the premise that each of those had,
potentially, its own separate legal and commercial usage, ending, abruptly, at the
county line, and multiply that merely by the number of years between 1895 and 1911,
we see the impossibility of the situation. 45
Justice McFaddin would have agreed with the above statement. He concurred
with the result reached by the majority in Ahne, but dissented from its reasoning, again
urging that a bright-line date be established. Again he reviewed the prior decisions,
accusing the majority of having “drifted like a ‘ship without a rudder.’”46 Justice
McFaddin again demonstrated the lack of consistency in the majority’s prior opinions,
concluding:
So we have gone from what the grantor intended, to what the parties
intended, to what was generally understood in the locality, to what was
understood in the particular county in which the land was located. It now
seems that there will have to be a case brought to this court from each of
44

Id.
At least until the Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision in Nicholsen, infra, it was
apparently assumed by most Arkansas attorneys that the Strohacker Doctrine
mandates a county-by-county fact determination, though the court has never really said
precisely what geographic subdivision is appropriate.
46
Ahne, 240 Ark. at 698, 401 S.W.2d at 569.
45
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the seventy-five counties in Arkansas to have determined when oil and
gas were first generally recognized as a mineral, in each such county; and
it is from that line of holdings that I must necessarily dissent. As I tried to
point out in my dissent in Stegall, I insist that oil and gas were generally
considered to be minerals in all of Arkansas as early as January 1, 1900.
I wish this court would so state and put an end to this 'drifting like a ship
without a rudder' course that we are pursuing on this question which is
vital to property.
In short, I still insist that I was right in my dissent in Stegall v. Bugh, supra.
I probably will not be on this court when another mineral reservation cases
arises; but I predict that at some time the court must fix a statewide date
when it was generally recognized that oil and gas were minerals. We
have before us in the case at bar as fine a record as will ever be
presented on this question; and I think this is the time when it should be
done; and I would still insist on January 1, 1900, as such date--or, if the
'beginning of the century' is considered a more poetic date, then Jan. 1,
1901, would satisfy the situation.47
Two early federal court cases, arising out of Arkansas’ Western District, further
illustrate the inconsistency with which the Strohacker Doctrine has been applied. They
are Mothner v. Ozark Real Estate Co.48 and Western Coal and Mining Co. v.
Middleton.49 Those two cases, both affirmances of decisions of U.S. District Judge
John E. Miller, reached results which are factually irreconcilable. In Mothner, Judge
Miller held that an 1897 non-specific Johnson County reservation included oil and gas,
relying to some extent upon exploration in Sebastian County as early as 1888 and
commercial production in that county in 1902. Then, in Middleton, Judge Miller held that
a 1904 nonspecific reservation in the very same Sebastian County did not reserve oil
and gas, a result difficult to imagine. Both of Judge Miller’s conflicting decisions were
affirmed by the federal court of appeals, because, according to the appeals court in
each case, neither decision was against the clear preponderance of the evidence.
I mention Mothner and Middleton not because they are, in any respect, binding
Arkansas precedents. Rather, these cases further illustrate the impossibility of
predicting ownership of oil and gas following a non-specific mineral reservation in a
given chain of title. That unpredictability, the opposite of the needed clear rule of
47

Id. at 700, 401 S.W.2d at 570-71.
300 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1962).
49
362 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1966).
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property, is exactly the problem.
I am aware of no reported Strohacker decision during the time of the Arkansas
Supreme Court’s opinion in Ahne and the Eighth Circuit Court’s conflicting decisions in
Mothner and Middleton, until 2010. The probable explanation for that void is that the
period between late 1960's and 2010 saw somewhat less Arkansas oil and gas
exploration. Exploration and production did not cease altogether, but there was no oil or
gas boom in process either. As we are all aware, that changed around 2004 with the
discovery of the Fayetteville Shale Play which brought a high level of exploration activity
to several previously inactive counties.
With that new economic activity, in new places, Strohacker litigation was sure to
follow. At least three cases were filed in United States District Court, each involving
nonspecific mineral reservations in deeds made in these new Shale Play counties.
They were Griffis v. Anadarko E&P Co.,50 Froud v. Anadarko E&P Co.51. and Robertson
v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. & XTO Energy Inc.52 Griffis, which controlled the ultimate results
of the other two, is the most important of those.
Griffis had filed suit to quiet title to minerals beneath the surface of land which he
owned in White County. Anadarko, as successor to the Missouri Pacific Railroad,
owned whatever minerals were effectively reserved by the railroad in a nonspecific
mineral reservation within a 1936 deed.
The Eighth Circuit panel, in an opinion by Judge Morris S. Arnold, held that the
1936 reservation effectively reserved oil and gas. Judge Arnold mentioned the
Strohacker Doctrine, which he termed “interesting and surprisingly complex.”53
However, he determined that a Strohacker analysis was unnecessary, holding, on
authority of the Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision in Sheppard v. Zeppa,54 that by the
1930's there was no issue, statewide, whether the term “minerals” included oil and gas,
50

606 F.3d 973 (8th Cir. 2010).
No. 4:09-CV-00936-WRW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91515 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 1, 2010).
52
No. 1-09CV00020-JLH, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88557 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 24, 2010).
53
Griffis, 606 F3d at 974.
54
199 Ark. 1, 133 S.W. 860 (1939).
51
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under Arkansas law.55 Thus, no Strohacker analysis was required. Judge Arnold
appeared grateful for that. In a subsequent opinion denying rehearing, Judge Arnold
predicted that the Arkansas Supreme Court would agree with his conclusion.56
Judge Arnold’s prediction soon proved correct. On April 12, 2012, the Arkansas
Supreme Court released its opinion in Staggs v. Union Pacific Railroad Company.57
Staggs involved a nonspecific mineral reservation contained within a deed executed by
the railroad in Independence County in 1934. The Arkansas Supreme Court had little
problem with that one, affirming the circuit court’s holding for the railroad’s successor.
In its opinion, authored by Justice Danielson, the court made an analysis almost
identical to that of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Griffis. One sentence of the
opinion stands out. The court indicated that “…at some point58 between 1905 and
1937, it became common knowledge in Arkansas that a reservation of mineral rights in
Arkansas included oil and gas.”59
Really, since the reservation in Staggs was contained within a 1934 deed, we
know from the result in that case that a generic mineral reservation within or after 1934
effectively reserved oil and gas. Actually, as Justice Danielson’s opinion suggests, the
date was probably earlier, perhaps much earlier. Unfortunately, that is all we know for
sure at this point. Surprisingly, the Staggs opinion, though important to the
development of Strohacker jurisprudence, was not released for publication in the
S.W.3d reporter.
Last year’ other Strohacker decision, Nicholson v. Upland Industrial Development
Company, et al.,60 involved a much earlier mineral reservation. The deed construed in
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Nicholson was executed by St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railway Company on
February 16, 1903. Its reservation, “[a]lso reserving all coal and mineral deposits in and
upon said lands,” was identical to the language of reservation in Strohacker itself.61 The
Nicholson deed conveyed lands in White County, though it was actually executed and
acknowledged in Pulaski County.
The landowners presented a simple argument: There was no evidence
presented showing production of oil and gas, nor was there an instrument conveying,
reserving or leasing oil and gas in White County, itself, prior to February 1903. Thus,
they reasoned, under Strohacker, the 1903 reservation could not have included oil and
gas. Their only witness was a seasoned landman who testified that his search of early
White County records indicated no deeds or leases mentioning oil and gas had been
filed for record on or before that date.
Upland, which ultimately prevailed, presented a much broader array of evidence.
Through the testimony of its expert witness, an emeritus Arkansas State University
distinguished history professor specializing in Arkansas history, Upland introduced
numerous newspaper articles, advertisements, and books tending to show that by
around 1900, residents, not only in White County but also in the area surrounding White
County, were aware that oil and gas were minerals, potentially productive in Arkansas.
Upland’s expert testified that by 1900 these newspaper articles, advertisements and
books were widely circulated in White County, which enjoyed daily rail service from
Little Rock and St. Louis. The trains carried newspapers, which were read by White
County residents who, according to census data, had a rather high literacy rate.
The landowners objected, without success, to all such testimony and exhibits.
Among those objections was their contention that evidence of knowledge or practice
beyond the actual borders of White County was irrelevant.
Nevertheless, the circuit court not only admitted Upland’s proffered evidence but
also found it to be persuasive, holding that, as a matter of law, oil and gas were within
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Supra.
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the generic definition of minerals in the area including White County on February 16,
1903.
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. The court’s opinion directly rejected the
landowners’ notion that each Strohacker analysis was required to stop, arbitrarily, at its
county line. Instead, the court recognized that the “area” where evidence of the
knowledge of oil and gas as mineral was relevant, was just that, an area, and not
precisely limited to the county containing the lands. Thus the court has focused future
Strohacker inquiries more generally, inviting evidentiary presentations similar to
Upland’s presentation in Nicholson. We are now left to wonder exactly what “area”
means, in terms of size and location.
The Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court’s decision in
Nicholson was not clearly erroneous. Thus, it affirmed. I suspect, however, that had
the circuit court held against Upland,62 that decision would likewise have survived
appeal.
The industry trade group, Arkansas Independent Producers and Royalty Owners,
submitted an amicus brief in Nicholson. Its brief urged the court to announce a datecertain, after which a generic mineral reservation included oil and gas, everywhere in
Arkansas, exactly as urged by Justice McFadden in his dissents in Stegall and Ahne.
That effort was not successful. So it appears that Nicholson, like almost all of its
predecessors, is just another affirmance of a lower court ruling which probably would
have been affirmed had it gone the other way.
So, then, what does it all mean? Suppose you are examining record title and
encounter a grant or reservation of “minerals” in an early deed, without specifying
whether oil and gas are included. Here are a few pointers:
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I.e. that oil and gas were not within the generic meaning of minerals in White County
and its surrounding area in February, 1903.
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1. If the non-specific grant or reservation was in or after 1934,63 oil and gas was
included. There is no need to make any curative requirement unless you
simply want your client to know that you are up on the law.
2. If the non-specific grant or reservation was between 1905 and 1934, there is
a good chance that, by its date, oil and gas had become commonly known as
minerals throughout Arkansas. Admittedly, the 29 years between 1905 and
1934 is a big, vague time window. Still, I personally feel that if the land you
are examining is in the “area” of White County64 or the “area” of Logan
County,65 it is a reasonably safe bet that the reservation included oil and gas.
Still, it is theoretically possible that someone will re-litigate the issue, even
within one of those “areas.” In theory, that re-litigation could reach a different
result, which might be sustained on appeal as not clearly against the
preponderance of the evidence. That said, I have a hard time worrying about
any grant or reservation in those “areas” after 1905. To be safe, I suggest a
title requirement, explaining the status of Arkansas case law, and asking your
client to soul-search before accepting the small risk that oil and gas was not
covered in the grant or reservation.
3. If the non-specific grant or reservation was between 1900 and 1905, I
recommend a stronger worded requirement, making clear that cases such as
Nicholson and Ahne merely affirmed specific lower court holdings based upon
specific records of the specific trials of specific cases. They did not lay down
absolute rules of law, even within their affected counties or “areas.” The risk
of an opposite decision in the future should not be assumed by the title
examiner. Should your client, after becoming informed, not be willing to
assume that risk, it can obtain protective leases.
4. If the non-specific grant or reservation was earlier than 1900, I doubt that it
effectively included oil and gas. However, we will not know for certain until
63
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and unless the specific reservation is litigated. I would construe the grant or
reservation as not to include oil and gas, and make a requirement similar to
that suggested in 3, above.
5. If you are examining lands in South Arkansas, and if the instrument’s date is
before about 1920,66 I suggest that you make a requirement that your client
determine for itself whether the non-specific grant or reservation did or did not
include oil and gas. There has not been another South Arkansas Strohacker
decision since Stegall was published in 1958. Stegall affirmed a chancellor’s
holding that oil and gas were not included in a 1900 reservation of “minerals.”
I personally believe that Stegall was wrongly decided. To me, the evidence
described in Justice McFadden’s dissenting opinion is precisely the type of
evidence which led to the opposite result in Nicholson. However, without a
case to rely upon, I am reluctant to make much of Nicholson in the context of
South Arkansas. That part of the state is certainly outside of the North
Arkansas “areas” of the more recent decisions. A title examiner should
exercise caution dealing with Strohacker there until there is more definitive
case law.
REFORMATION EPIDEMIC BRINGS UNCERTAINTY TO TITLES
I was taught, long ago, that appellate courts have two distinct functions. One of
those is to consider whether individual cases were wrongly decided and, if so, to
straighten the matter out. The other function is to honor the rules of law so that our
future behavior may be guided by those rules. Occasionally, those functions come into
conflict. Sometimes, the strict application of a rule of law works hardship upon an
individual litigant. I learned that, sad as it might appear, the rule of law is more
important than the individual case. When courts bend the rules, yielding to the urge to
reach the “right” result, they hand down bad legal precedents, which cause uncertainty
as to the rules bent. Then, lawyers being lawyers, such uncertainty spawns needless,
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18

costly litigation. No business needs to work in an environment of uncertainty. The oil
and gas industry is particularly vulnerable, for it must rely almost entirely upon the public
land records to determine who owns what mineral interest. Judicial decisions which
undermine the ability to rely upon those records are just plain bad for those in our line of
work.
Recently, some of us have detected a tendency on the part of the Arkansas
Court of Appeals to go along with lower court results which may be “right” in the social
sense, but clearly violate what should be firm principles of law. Unfortunately, the
Arkansas Supreme Court seldom accepts review of these decisions, so the bad
precedents issue forth. Here are some recent examples.
Dray v. Likens67 deserves mention. Here is a summary of its facts. Mid-Ark
Property Management, Inc. developed a residential area in Crawford County. It
contracted to sell adjoining tracts to Likens and Lee, who apparently were friends. Each
contract called for Mid-Ark to include a water line easement across another tract, Tract
10, which separated the Likens and Lee tracts from the public road, to provide each
tract with water service from the municipal water system of the town of Dyer. The deed
to the Lees expressly included the promised easement, but the deed to the Likens failed
to do so, apparently by mistake. The ditch was dug across Tract 10, and both lines
were laid in the same ditch.
Later, Mid-Ark sold Tract 10 to the Hensons, who then sold it to the Drays. The
Drays were unaware of the Likens’ water line across their land, though they had record
notice of the Lee easement, which was in the Lee deed. When the water lines were
accidently dug up by a neighbor, the Drays, who apparently did not get along well with
the Likens, sued to require removal of the Likens’ water line.
The Drays lost. The trial court, affirmed by the court of appeals, held that since
the water lines were in the same ditch, the Likens’ water line was not a “burden” upon
the Drays’ land. The trial court thus retroactively reformed the deed from Mid-Ark to the
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Likens, so as to include the missing easement. The Drays, BFPs after BFPs, became
burdened by an easement of which they had no actual or constructive notice.
It is easy to understand the social “correctness” of the result in this case. One
can imagine that the Drays were being darn un-neighborly when they sought removal of
a water line laid, in good faith, beside and in the same ditch with another line of which
they had no right to complain. Still, it is the principle of the thing which needs
protecting. Reformation of deeds, between the parties to those deeds, is one thing. 68
Ignoring the rights of BFPs, regardless what we think those rights are worth, is another.
We do our business based upon record title. Who can we trust to make this distinction
between a burden which is a “burden,” and one which is not?
A far better result would have been to require the Likens to purchase an
easement of necessity from the Drays. They could then have tried to collect that
easement’s cost from Mid-Ark, which apparently made the mistake in the first place. Of
course, an easement of necessity should only be given in a case of true necessity. If
the Likens can get water to their land another way, they should do so, perhaps putting
any extra cost on Mid-Ark.
While we are complaining about reformation, let us look at Mauldin v. Snowden,69
along with a later case between some of the same parties, Longing Family Revocable
Living Trust v. Snowden.70 In both of those cases the court of appeals affirmed circuit
court decrees of “reformation” in favor of Snowden, not only against purchasers from
the Snowdens, but also against persons who purchased from those purchasers.
The Snowdens owned no minerals when they conveyed to the Florys, without
reservation, who later conveyed to the Mauldins, also without reservation. Likewise, the
Snowdens owned no minerals when they conveyed to Tri.Con, without reservation,
which later conveyed to the Longings, also without reservation. In each case, the
Snowdens had once owned mineral interests which they conveyed to Cenark, a
corporation whose stock they apparently owned. When the Snowdens reacquired those
68
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mineral interests from Cenark, both the Mauldins and the Longings claimed they had
become the owners of those interests by operation of the Arkansas After-Acquired Title
Statute.71 The circuit court did not agree with that. In both cases, all deeds were
judicially “reformed” to insert mineral reservations in favor of the Snowdens, who made
the mistake in the first place.72 In each case the trial court found, and the appeals court
affirmed, that the Snowdens did not intend to sell those minerals which they later
reconveyed to themselves. Likewise, the trial court found, and the appeals court
affirmed that neither the Snowdens’ immediate grantees, nor the second grantee
plaintiffs, had expected to receive minerals. Probably we should feel empathy for the
Snowdens for having accidentally given up mineral interests over a technicality. Still,
that technicality comes from a perfectly good Arkansas statute which restates an
ancient common law rule.
Last, I must mention the two cases, Deltic Timber Corporation v. Newland.73
Those cases deal with a 1984 deed from Batson, the Newland’s father, to Deltic,
containing language [excepting] “all prior, valid reservations of record of oil, gas and/or
conveyances of record of oil, gas and other minerals.” In Newland I, the Arkansas
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision that such language effectively
reserved a remainder interest owned, at the time, by Batson. Instead, the appeals court
decided, sua sponte, that this commonly used phrase74 was ambiguous. Thus the case
was remanded for trial as to the parties’ intent.
That trial came more than 25 years after the execution of the “ambiguous” deed.
Unfortunately, most of those who could have been witnesses were dead, impaired or
missing. Regardless, the result was a determination that the grantors had, indeed,
meant to reserve their remainder interest.
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In its second appeal, Newland II, Deltic contended, citing additional authority, that
the quoted phrase was not ambiguous. Deltic’s arguments failed to persuade the court
of appeals, which held that its prior determination of ambiguity, whether right or wrong,
had become the law of the case and could not be reconsidered.
I am one of the attorneys who lost the appeals of Newland I and Newland II, as
well as the trial in between them. Perhaps I am sounding like I have been eating rotten
grapes. That is not my intent.
Here is the point. The phrase “all prior, valid reservations of record of oil, gas
and/or conveyances of record of oil, gas and other minerals mineral” is not ambiguous.
Calling it ambiguous simply calls into question the meaning of thousands of prior and
future deeds which used, and will use, similar-to-identical exceptions.
I submit that what happened there is what happened in each of the other cases
discussed in this section of this paper. The grantor or deed preparer made a mistake at
the time of the conveyance, accomplishing something other than that which was
intended. Then, to make things right between the parties, a court bent the rules to
accomplish results.
Newland I and Newland II were not reformation cases. Had they been and had
they reached the same result, their precedents would make a little more sense. Still,
there is something a little shaky about reforming a twenty-five year old deed, is there
not?
My point is simply that, while real people in real cases are important, the rules
are important too. They should not be jeopardized in order to reach results, no matter
how much we might wish for those results to happen.
THE END IS NEAR
It may come as a disappointment that the subtitle above is unrelated to any
known or imagined apocalypse. That would have been be a good guess, but incorrect.
I refer, instead, to my hope for the timely adjournment of the current session of
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Arkansas’ most gun-totin-baby-birthin General Assembly, ever.75 That particular rapture
is not yet here, but do not give up hope. That tea-partying collection of elected citizens
remains hard at its law-makin as the deadline for this article looms.
Take heart in this. The current Legislative obsession with guns and abortions
has a side benefit. Aside from succeeding masterfully in making our once nearprogressive state into a poster child of redneckary, this year’s session has done little
real harm, yet.76
We must stay wary. As Yogi taught: “it’s not over, ‘til it’s over.” Once the
Legislature tackles the state’s real problems, the usual array of bills, directed toward the
oil and gas industry, could still come.77 I will report further when I deliver this paper in a
couple of weeks.
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